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A BRIEF COMMENT ON TRUST PROTECTORS
Jeffrey Evans Stake*
In Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, Professor
Stewart Sterk has provided a valuable and insightful exposition of many
of the issues arising from the recent importation of trust protectors from
offshore asset protection trusts into domestic trusts.) Naturally, there
are many other questions that he could not address. This Comment adds
one point to Professor Sterk's extensive discussion. Much of his
analysis applies the agency cost approach suggested by Professor
Robert Sitkoff in his seminal article, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust
Law,2 and in so doing focuses on many considerations that should be
important to settlors of domestic trusts. There is another level of
consideration that also deserves attention, that of the common good.
What are the social welfare costs and benefits of adding trust protectors
to the toolkit available to settlors or testators?3
This Comment divides the analysis into two strands, with the
criterion of division being the purpose of the trust protector. A trust
protector can be employed for the benefit of beneficiaries or solely for
the purpose of protecting the wishes and designs of the settlor. The first
part of this Comment addresses those situations in which the trust
protector is employed, at least in substantial part, for the benefit of the
trust beneficiaries. The second part discusses some of the consequences
that flow when the protector is employed to further the intention of the
settlor separate and apart from the interests of the beneficiaries. This
Comment ends with a tentative recommendation for law reform.
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. The ideas expressed
here were stimulated by the excellent conference, Trust Law in the 21st Century, hosted by the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, September 19, 2005. I thank Christopher S. Stake for
helpful comments.
I Stewart Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2761 (2006).
2 Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).
3 Although much of the analysis applies equally to whether the trust is created inter vivos or
in a will, this Comment will refer only to settlors.
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1. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE BENEFICIARIES
Notwithstanding possible counterproductive effects catalogued by
Professor Sterk,4 it is likely that some trust protectors whose powers are
designed to protect the interests of beneficiaries will indeed improve the
management of their trusts. Moreover, that is ordinarily a call for the
settlor to make. When the terms of the trust instrument make it clear
that the function of the trust protector is to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries, it is reasonable to presume that the settlor is correct in her
judgment that the beneficiaries will be better off because of the presence
of the protector.
Indeed, it is possible to imagine a number of roles the protector
might play, any one of which could improve benefits to beneficiaries
and, at the same time, improve social welfare. The predominant model
of the trust incorporating a protector appears to be a private, hierarchical
structure. The trust protector plays a role somewhat like the board of
directors of a corporation 5 overseeing the performance of the
management on behalf of the shareholders, or in this case, the trust
beneficiaries. But other models might be used to invent protectors of
the interests of the beneficiaries. One such model might be taken from
constitutional law rather than corporate law. The role of the trustee
carrying out the instructions of the settlor with money supplied by the
settlor for the benefit of the beneficiaries can be seen as analogous to
the role of the executive carrying out the instructions of the legislature
with money supplied by the legislature for the benefit of the public.
This analogy suggests roles for the trust protector different from
that of trustee overseer. A settlor might wish to cast the trust protector
in the judicial role of hearing and resolving disputes between the
beneficiaries and the trustee. Such an administrative structure could
have a number of advantages. First, the protector might better serve the
interests of the beneficiaries because he knows them and their needs far
better than a court does. Second, the beneficiaries might be in a better
position to keep the trustee honest because they would not need to raise
the money to underwrite a lawsuit or worry about the social opprobrium
that may accompany recourse to a court. And, with the protector
readily available for resolving suits at low cost, the trustee might feel
more pressure to adhere to his best guess as to what the protector would
consider to be in the interests of the beneficiaries. Finally, if the
protector were substituted for the court, society would benefit from the
reduced load on publicly supported tribunals. The internalization of the
4 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 1, at 2789.
5Id.
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dispute resolution costs could be good for both the beneficiaries and the
public.
One problem with having the protector take on a judicial role is
that the protector's jurisdiction could be invoked only if the
beneficiaries were able to monitor and detect deviations from their
interests. If they do not know enough about what the trustee's activities
are or should be, they will be unable to bring their complaint before the
protector. In these situations, the beneficiaries need an advocate to
watch out for them more actively. The governmental analogy might be
pushed in a different direction by setting up a protector in the role of an
independent prosecutor charged with protecting the beneficiaries'
interests from trustee malfeasance. In many cases, such a protector
would be better able to vindicate the interests of the beneficiaries than
they themselves could do. And, as above, the mere presence of the
private prosecutor might cause the trustee to hew more closely to the
interests of the beneficiaries. Finally, the two roles are not mutually
exclusive. The settlor could establish two protectors, one as a
prosecutor and another as a judge, if she preferred that to having the
prosecuting protector bring his case in state courts.
II. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE SETTLOR
It is less clear that there will be welfare benefits when the
draftsman creates a protector to ensure that the trustee follows the goals
of the settlor than when she designs the protector to protect the interests
of the beneficiaries. Although the settlor ostensibly created the trust to
benefit the beneficiaries, their interests need not be coterminous with
those of the settlor. By preventing the beneficiaries from collectively
terminating the trust while a material purpose of the settlor remains, the
Claflin6 doctrine affirms that there are judicially cognizable interests of
the settlor separate from those of the beneficiaries.
What then are the costs and benefits to society when the protector
acts to protect the goals of the settlor as distinct from those of the
beneficiaries? If the settlor is alive, there are clear gains to her. On the
other side of the equation, the living settlor can also appreciate the
direct costs of compensating the protector and indirect agency costs
suffered if the protector unexpectedly reduces the degree to which the
trustee follows the intent of the settlor. The living settlor can weigh
those costs and benefits, and there is no need for second-guessing her
choice.
6 Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
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In many cases, however, the settlor will employ the protector to
watch out for her interests after she is dead and her interests have
dropped out of the social welfare equation. In some of these cases, the
protector's actions will not further the interests of the beneficiaries.
What is the social gain or loss from the action of the protector? It is
possible, of course, that the protector would affirmatively enjoy such a
task, and would be willing to do it for no compensation whatsoever. If
that is the case, the trust's creation of the role of protector could well
add to social welfare; the settlor has provided the protector some
entertainment. But assume that the actual performance of the duty is
not enjoyable, that the protector would not work without pay. In such
cases, there is a clear difference between the trust having a protector and
not having one, and it no longer favors the protector. From a societal
point of view, the settlor has caused a person, presumably a person of
some talent, to forego leisure and opportunities for productive behavior
in favor of furthering the intent of a dead person. Thus, society is left
paying the continuing and probably escalating costs of the settlor's
fancy.
This problem would be exacerbated in a perpetual private trust,
which has been made possible by the abolition of the Rule Against
Perpetuities in many jurisdictions. 7 Suppose that the settlor settles a
perpetual trust to pay someone, say someone with a professional degree,
to throw rocks in the ocean for eight hours a day, chanting her name
with each throw. Assuming that we will not have any social use for
more rocks in the ocean or names chanted into the air, should courts-
100, 1000, or 10,000 years from today--continue to honor the trust?
The amounts paid by the trust for this service are mere transfer
payments; they increase the wealth of the thrower while decreasing the
wealth of the trust and its potential beneficiaries, for a net social gain of
zero. Since the social gain from the rocks tossed and the payments
made is zero, the key consideration in the social welfare calculus is the
effort expended. This human labor is wasted. The rock tosser could
have created valuable goods and services instead. Or, he could have
used the time for leisure activities such as watching television or
anything else that he might have enjoyed more than tossing rocks. The
value of the goods he could have created or the leisure he could have
enjoyed is the social loss from honoring the trust. The behavior of a
trust protector, when there is no benefit to the beneficiaries, is like that
7 The Rule Against Perpetuities serves at least five purposes. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin,
Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705 (1990). The Rule (1)
frees land for development by terminating options, (2) makes land more purchasable by a non-
owner, (3) makes assets more enjoyable for an owner by eliminating restrictions on behavior and
reducing uncertainty, (4) fairly divides between generations the enjoyment taken from the act of
giving control, and (5) reallocates interests from people who cannot enjoy ownership of the
interest to people who can. Id.
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of the chanting rock tosser. The protector's efforts have no utility other
than that to the settlor and, as just noted, she is dead.
The usual response, of course, is that honoring her intent after she
is dead, while doing nothing to increase utility at that time, makes the
settlor happier while she is alive. Thus, the question is whether the
happiness of knowing intent will be followed outweighs the losses of
leisure and productivity. This question is not easy to answer, but there
are two considerations. First, the law has chosen, at times, not to honor
testamentary requests to destroy assets. There is no economic reason to
suppose that the human efforts to be saved by eliminating a trust
protector are any less valuable than the property saved when the
instructions to destroy it are ignored. Indeed, because a trust could last
forever, it might have greater potential for wasting human resources
than a simple instruction to destroy some tangible personalty.
8
Second, not only is there large potential for waste, as measured
from the point starting with the settlor's death, there is reason to
question the size of the settlor's benefits from the protector's efforts.
Honoring the intent of settlors that create protectors after they are dead
makes settlors feel better while they are alive, but how much better?
The analysis at this point gets quite speculative because it is hard to put
the protector genie back into the lamp. Once settlors become aware of
the use of protectors, they may feel uncomfortable without one. But if
they are never told about the need for protectors, i.e., if no one raises the
issue of trustee misbehaviors that are beyond courts to rectify, many
settlors will go to their graves perfectly content with their settlements.
For them, protectors only serve to quell fears they would have never had
if protectors and the need for them had not been mentioned.
Some may say that because the market works and individuals will
behave rationally, there is no possibility that the increase in settlor
security will not be worth the costs. Perhaps this is so, but it also seems
possible that lawyers and others will, in good faith or bad,9 raise fears
that would not otherwise arise. One of the benefits of legal advice is
that lawyers sometimes think of possibilities that the client did not. In
this context, where the protector is being employed solely to follow the
8 It is worth noting that the efforts of a trust protector one thousand years from now should
not be discounted to present value, or at least should not be discounted to present value by the
rate of inflation. To be accurate, we should increase the value of labor by the rate at which
professional wages will rise over the next thousand years. Then that figure, which of course will
be huge, should be discounted by the rate of inflation over the same years. If wages outstrip
inflation, then the result will be that an hour of labor wasted one thousand years from now will be
worth more than the same hour today. Thus, it is easy to see that the dozens of hours wasted for
each of the next thousand years could have a very large present value.
9 Lawyers might raise the fears of trustee misbehavior to induce clients to draft new trust
instruments, thus generating more income for the lawyers. Lawyers will often think they are
doing the client a favor, without asking themselves whether the client is actually any happier at
the end of the day.
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settlor's intent after she is dead and not for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, what is usually good legal planning may fail to yield any
increase in social welfare. Empirical research that compares the
security felt by those who use protectors for domestic trusts to those
who are never told about them might shed some light on this issue.
III. LAW REFORM
On this initial analysis it matters whether the settlor created the
position of trust protector to make sure she gets what she wants after she
is dead or to make sure the beneficiaries are well served. Because it is
hard to get inside the head of the settlor, applying this distinction will
often be difficult. However, there is a set of circumstances in which it
may not matter which thoughts or feelings actually motivated the
settlor. When all of the beneficiaries agree that the trust protector is not
serving their interests, we should presume that they are right.
Therefore, when they all agree, the beneficiaries should be allowed to
eliminate the compensation for the trust protector and free the trust from
that drag on the trust assets. In other words, the Claflin doctrine should
not be extended to protect the trust protector. 10 In addition, it may be
possible in the future to identify other circumstances in which the trust
protector fails to benefit the beneficiaries, and perhaps the courts should
be willing to eliminate the protector in those situations as well.
The remaining, and larger, question is whether anything else
should be done. It would be imprudent to say trust protectors are not
authorized to take any legal action or that the provisions of the trust
authorizing protectors are unenforceable. It is hard to justify such a
severe limitation on settlors, especially when trust protectors could be
quite useful for offshore and charitable trusts. For similar reasons, an
ethical rule discouraging lawyers from recommending protectors would
appear unjustified. Nor should volunteers be prevented from
performing their protecting assignments if they enjoy them. But
whether protectors that are compensated should continue to be paid is
another matter.
The normative policy analysis of trust protector law is in its
infancy. As with other issues involving wills and trusts, the intent of the
decedent and the costs of administration are likely to drive much of the
analysis. But those are not the only concerns. The deployment of
human resources deserves close attention and, in that connection, it is
10 Whether the Claflin doctrine itself deserves elimination is a topic too large for this
Comment, but some of the same considerations would seem applicable, at least in situations
where the trust is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
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important to keep in mind that self-interested decisions by informed
private actors will not necessarily reach an efficient allocation.

